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Jill Stauffer
Speaking Truth to Reconciliation:
Political Transition, Recovery, and the Work of Time
Layers of Betrayal
Over ten years passed between the disappearance of Charity Kondile’s son, Sizwe, and
her learning what had befallen him. One day she opened up a newspaper reporting on
testimony at a commission put together to investigate a counterinsurgency unit of the
South African police. In the report she discovered that her son had been apprehended,
tortured to the point of having a brain hemorrhage, given poison—which didn’t
work—then transported to a remote farm and shot, and finally burnt in a fire. In her
testimony before South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, she said:
Well, Dirk Coetzee goes on further to say that when he died, they put his body
on a pile of wood with a tyre near the Komatiepoort River at night, where it took
them nine hours to burn his body. Dirk Coetzee further states that twice they
were burning his body, the flesh was smelling good, and they were having beers at
the time. So it was like a [barbecue] to them.1
Her testimony also addressed how the lives of her family had been transformed by
their loss: Sizwe’s sister suffering from depressive psychosis; a brother so depressed he
could not take care of himself; a child left fatherless; and Mrs. Kondile herself, the
mother who, instead of being supported by the surrounding community, was treated
like a traitor when her son disappeared, because his comrades too quickly assumed he
had betrayed his cause. Mrs. Kondile’s case shows how complex the layers of betrayal,
suspicion, and harm can be in a political struggle. A story will rarely be limited to a
tale of good guys versus bad guys. Her anger and sadness were caused by not only the
police who killed her son and the government that authorized that killing but also
members of her community who believed that he was a traitor and by officials of the
government and of community organizations who had not apologized for treating her
family unjustly.
It is a dynamic story of loss. Mrs. Kondile did not only lose a son. She lost the
sense that she could expect that she and her loved ones would be protected from
harm. She also lost the security of living in a community where she could trust that,
if she were harmed, she would be helped and her harms recompensed. She lost a
world, and so she lost some of the conditions necessary for coherent self-formation.
If we do not take the time to understand that loss, we will not know how that
world and that self might be rebuilt. In such conditions, justice will not be seen to be
done. Justice, when we think of it as a response to wrongdoing, is engaged in the
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diachronic work of redressing a past for the sake of a future that isn’t fully determined
by past harms—it aims to help us view the past differently. In the past few decades
we have seen an explosion of revisionary practices such as transitional justice, political
reconciliation, and discourses of forgiveness and restoration. Also in that time, we
have seen innumerable law journal and other scholarly articles, as well as newspaper
reports, claim that these processes are healing or cathartic for survivors. Many of those
assertions were authored anecdotally or hopefully, without the support of empirical
data. I do not state that as an accusation, because such data largely did not exist.
Empirical studies did not exist because interest in these forms of justice is relatively
new, and because the experiences of witnesses have rarely been important to larger
political debates.2 There now are some studies—using data from South Africa, Sierra
Leone, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia—suggesting that testifying in institutional
settings may be healing for some.3 But there is as much evidence that testifying can
reawaken trauma or a sense of injustice rather than help victims find closure.4 For
instance, one study showed that, in Rwanda, gacaca witnesses suffer from much higher
levels of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder—up to !" percent higher—
than do nonwitnesses.5
The reasons for this are complex and cannot be folded into a neat theory. Thus
my aim in this essay is not to offer a full-coverage theory of reconciliation but to show
how the implicit liberalism backing most ideas about transition and reconciliation
cannot accomplish the goals that those institutions and ideas pursue. Something more
is needed. That ‘‘something’’ also will be impossible to contain in a neat theory, given
how diverse the sites and histories of human violence are. And so I will begin by
focusing on the barest of universalities: that human beings are vulnerable creatures
whose selves are formed in relation to others and the surrounding world. What kind
of being is a human being such that revision and recovery are possible? What condi-
tions would allow such a being to experience the present moment in such a way that
the future is not imprisoned in the past—what sets the present moment free? These
questions inevitably bear on law, politics, and human autonomy, but they also range
beyond what those things can accomplish, and thus we must look beyond liberal
assumptions about autonomy and the rule of law to answer them well.
A Qualification
It should be admitted up front that reconciliation might not be the goal of a
community in transition from conflict to peace or cessation of violence. It may be, for
reasons widely apparent, that there can be no reconciliation with the enemy. As
Michel Feher puts it, ‘‘In #$!%, everyone would agree, the issue was not to reconcile
the Nazis with their enemies and victims but to make reconciliation with Germany
incumbent on its rejection of Nazism.’’6 Reconciliation may also be impossible
because of cultural attitudes and histories. As a memorandum of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees notes,
In Rwanda . . . the attitude of the government in the years that followed the
genocide was to insist on the need for justice. The word ‘‘reconciliation’’ was
taboo for those who had survived the genocide, and was never publicly used . . .
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In Kosovo, the very word ‘‘reconciliation’’ is so charged for the Albanian
community, that it is simply not used.7
Finally, no one can dictate to another person or group what can or ought to be
forgiven—hence the ambivalence that will always remain in some part of any ‘‘offi-
cially’’ reconciling population. We edge up against the real limits of reconciliation
most often when reconciliation is conceived as forgiveness and forgiveness is linked to
amnesty or amnesia with regard to the past. Even if it weren’t too much to ask of
anyone recovering from violence, trauma, and loss, amnesia would be impossible.
What is possible and desirable in each case will vary. Pertinent factors include the
history of the institutions and the society; the prospects for community-building;
distribution of minority and majority groups, victims, and perpetrators; the
involvement of international institutions and NGOs; the amount of time passed since
violence; how many were involved in the conflict; whether it was one-sided or there
was fighting on all sides; whether the governing power is new or composed of
members of an old regime; and so on. These things all affect what is possible, and
they vary from site to site.8
The differences in how Spain, Poland, Chile, Argentina, and South Africa handled
their transitions speaks to this. To draw the differences with broad and therefore
reductive strokes: Spain and Poland chose the clean-slate method, drawing a ‘‘thick
line’’ between past and present, with the hope that everyone could start anew in
conditions of political freedom; Chile pursued the route of disclosure of truth and
public apology. Dominant reasoning assumed that it wasn’t possible in Chile to pros-
ecute everyone who had done wrong under Pinochet, in part because the military still
had a lot of power, and the evidence was hidden. But on the other hand, Chile
couldn’t just wipe the slate clean, because the larger society could not live with letting
torturers and oppressors go without punishment. Argentina tried to wipe the slate
clean but then came under pressure from citizens to act otherwise. South Africa chose
amnesty and truth over criminal trials and punishment. None of these choices has
produced unqualified success. All of them have been revisited, some of them many
times (as I will discuss later), in response to the people’s need to see justice done and
to how perceptions of the ‘‘doneness’’ of justice transform over time.
Take, for instance, the experience, over time, of Jean Améry, a Holocaust survivor.
In !"#$ Améry felt at one with the world because the world was collectively horrified
at what had befallen him. In !"%$ he felt as if the magnitude of the loss imposed on
him had not been truly marked by the German people. He felt that way for a number
of reasons: lack of accountability for those who participated in the brutalities, the
impatient attitudes of younger generations of Germans tired of hearing about the
crimes of their fathers, and even the silence of his fellow camp survivors.9 There are
layers of betrayal here, too, as in the Kondile case. Many of the layers in Améry’s case
lack discernible perpetrators, which points us to a wider responsibility for the success
of reconciliation.
Narratives of recovery and reconciliation may reinscribe oppression by declaring
problems solved or by settling on one official story that silences certain flows of history
that form the lifeblood of some remaining survivors. Negative or unjust possibilities
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append every positive aspiration of conciliative efforts. And we cannot predict with
certainty how present-day decisions and compromises will weather the passing of time.
Therefore, every argument about reconciliation between persons, groups, and polities
recovering from conflict must include serious qualification of assertions approaching
universality.
Transitional Justice and the Limits of Universality
We are all vulnerable creatures prey to physical and psychological wounding. We
respond to others despite ourselves because of how we are formed, conscious of the
world around us. We all need food, shelter, protection, and probably community,
love, and help when we are in trouble. How those things look will vary from place to
place and person to person; move much beyond this list and universality begins to
give way to difference.
For those and other reasons, transitional justice, a diverse set of practices aimed at
making the development of democratic governance possible, is relentlessly contextual,
operating in widely variant sociohistorical, economic, and cultural conditions. And
yet we may still hazard some generalizations: it aims to deal with a past for the sake
of creating a present moment that makes a more just future possible. And it is widely
believed that to achieve such a future, creating stable institutions governed by the rule
of law should be a main goal.
Within these modest but important shared goals there is much room for
disagreement. Arguments often rage over whether trials are preferable to truth
commissions for dealing with the past, whether amnesty rather than criminal account-
ability should be sought for some past violators for the sake of political stability, or
whether the past should be incorporated into the present moment or symbolically
separated from it. These are important choices, linked to the context and history of a
community or nation. But concern for institution-building may obscure another
source of truth about justice and reconciliation: the people who will accept or refuse
those institutions. That truth bears on whether justice will be seen to be done. So,
stepping to the side of the choices among truth commissions, trials, criminal account-
ability, amnesty, principle, and compromise, I will ask about the selves who undergo
and in some cases recover from political violence and oppression, for the sake of
thinking carefully about the political and institutional conditions that make reconcilia-
tion’s success more or less likely.
It is clear that there is no unified answer to the question about selves, recovery,
and violence. The same occurrence of violence will traumatize some and not others.
The same set of reparative measures will reassure some and revictimize others. We all
have different strengths and weaknesses, triggers and indifferences. Some of that will
be determined by our social and cultural surroundings, but even if we account for
those differences, the uniqueness of each human being guarantees that no amount of
fieldwork, theorizing, or data-gathering will allow us to predict with certainty how a
human being will react to violence and cope with its legacy.
Given all that, how might transitional justice or reconciliatory work create a
present moment that redresses a past violation so that the future is set free from past
harm? How might oppressed, unjustly treated, or traumatized selves recover (or
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acquire for the first time) the ability to take on the present moment freely—to expe-
rience the present moment as free? And what does it mean to take on the present
moment freely? Depends on whom you ask.
If you ask someone who is attached to the idea of the rule of law, then all you
need in order to take on the present moment freely is the rule of law enforced by fair
and transparent institutions. We do need to be careful about making blanket state-
ments about revisionary practices, liberalism, or the rule of law, as these all have
diverse meanings and operate in widely variant conditions. And yet there are common-
alities. Michel Feher gives us a good version of the ‘‘tenets of liberal theory’’ as they
bear on theories of political reconciliation:
(!) that instituting a democratic regime amounts to substituting the rule of law for
the reign of force; (") that upholding the rule of law amounts to making every
citizen accountable for his or her actions; and (#) that implementing the principle
of individual accountability amounts to securing that no group of citizens will
either benefit from the privilege of impunity or be held collectively responsible on
the basis of their identity.10
In that telling of the story, the strength of an institution governed by the rule of law
is that in replacing force with law, we rid politics of two problems: if everyone is free
and equal, then no one is oppressed and everyone is responsible for his or her freely
undertaken actions. You might say that transitional justice is a mixed-heritage
descendant of liberalism, always hoping that formal equality is a utopia.
And perhaps utopia is precisely what that is. When we place our faith in the power
of the rule of law to govern fairly and to facilitate the production of subjects who obey
law because law keeps them safe and fairly treated, we assume something about the
subjects who are there to be ‘‘produced.’’ We assume that they are capable of trusting
that law can keep them safe and treat them justly, and thus we credit them with
having a Kantian ability to reason about a kingdom of ends. Of course, the great
majority of human beings do have that ability (regardless of whether they have read
or even heard of Kant), and creating stable institutions governed by the rule of law is
one way to produce conditions under which that ability will be rewarded. Assuming
the subject’s autonomy, as liberal theories of the rule of law do, corresponds with a
just aspiration to respect human dignity by acknowledging that we are capable of
freedom.
But even the most autonomy-loving liberal theories know deep down that the
human subject is more complicated than the story about autonomous persons capable
of consenting to political conditions, as evidenced by the circularity involved in social-
contract accounts of the subject’s production. Put briefly, the social contract assumes
that in order for there to be good and stable legal/political institutions, there must
first be free subjects willing to obey. At the same time, the same theories assume that,
in order for there to be free subjects willing to obey, there first have to be good and
stable legal/political institutions in place. For the liberal philosopher John Rawls, this
surfaces in the tension between the ‘‘basic structure’’ and the ‘‘natural duty of
justice.’’11 This circular account is not the vicious circle of a flawed logic but rather an
admission, even if tacit, that subject formation is fluid and multidirectional.
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Autonomy is not an essence but is rather created over time by the interaction of
human beings with the practices and institutions that both form human beings and
are formed by human beings. This idealized point should carry some weight in the
non-ideal world of transitional justice.
One can set up the rule of law and enforce it, train judges to be impartial, and
make the procedures and institutions open and known to all. That is a worthy goal.
But it does not suffice to set up legal institutions guided by the rule of law and then
inform everyone that the institutions are just, especially in a society recovering from a
period of mass violence. Reasoned argument on its own is not likely to persuade
someone who has experienced persecution—especially persecution that was ignored
or even authorized by law—that the rule of law will keep individuals safe from perse-
cution, even if institutions guided by the rule of law are an individual’s best hope of
attaining equal justice.
Nor can one make democracy happen by enforcing new rules. Liberal institutions
do not work when they rely too heavily on enforcement. (A form of law that functions
only by getting itself forcefully enforced is called tyranny or worse.) As such, equal
freedom and equal justice require more than fair and just institutions. Subjects who
want justice not only for themselves but for all, who trust that there are others who
desire the same and that institutions will work to reward those expectations—this is,
in part, what Mrs. Kondile lost—must be there first, or very soon after, if liberal
institutions are to succeed. As the IDEA Handbook on Reconciliation after Violent
Conflict puts it,
This is not simply a moral argument about doing the right thing, even though
reconciliation can contain strong moral elements . . . It is much more than that.
Put bluntly, good democratic politics—even the best politics—only work when
relationships between the various actors are positive enough to permit basic trust,
respect and cooperation. Bad relationships—those still built on distrust, suspicion,
fear, accusation, even ignorance—will effectively and eventually destroy any
political system based on respect for human rights and democratic structures.12
The case of Mrs. Kondile makes clear that in every scene of reconciliation there is a
complicated series of bad relationships. The rule of law on its own can’t change them,
and unless they can be transformed, the rule of law is not sufficient to get the job of
reconciliation done. Without reconciliation, transitional justice may falter. As such, a
minimal solidarity prior to or beyond politics is required. Thus, in order to get at
what makes successful transition or reconciliation possible, we must also ask about the
human subject, about its self and its relationship to others and the world.
The Persecuted Subject
Does liberalism’s tacit admission of the fluidity of subject formation in autonomous
beings take us far enough? I think not. The picture of human relations offered here
leaves out legacies of harm always present in a scene of reconciliation (and, I would
add, everywhere else). The circular account in which the subject makes the institution
and the institution makes the subject works well in a place where we imagine condi-
tions to be genial for the free and equal forming of institution and subjects (a place
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such as Rawls’s original position, Kant’s noumenal realm, or Rousseau’s oak tree,
where small bands of like-minded peasants meet to agree that they agree on the values
of governance, and no one is suffering from trauma or other legacies of injustice).13
But imagine such a circle landing, much like Dorothy’s house in The Wizard of Oz,
in a scene of political transition. Where are the subjects who are ready to trust that
law will treat them fairly and well, who for that reason ‘‘give the law to themselves’’
and practice it freely? Who will build the fair and neutral legal institution, relying on
what set of values? Who will be its judges, its lawyers, its clerks and jailers? And what
will this legal institution do with the traumas and abuses carried by those who come
to it—not only witnesses giving testimony but likely also the judges, lawyers, clerks,
and jailers? How will autonomy measure up against traumatic events that ‘‘overwhelm
the ordinary systems of care that give people a sense of control, connection, and
meaning’’?14
I think the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas can help here. He describes the human
self as compound, made up of parts we might call self, ego, and ‘‘me,’’ all residing in
a bodily frame that is vulnerable and undeniably affected by others. He theorizes that
subjectivity is subjection to other human beings: the subject is a hostage, persecuted
by the other, bearing infinite responsibility and owed nothing in return—an alarming
set of assertions. Instead of describing an always-already autonomous being that is by
definition free to make decisions on right and value unaffected by others, Levinas
gives us a subject formed in heteronomy and responsive to the misfortunes of others
long before freedom is possible. His intent is not to deny our freedom but to draw
attention to the vulnerability that defines us as embodied beings and thus bears on
what freedom can be for us.
Here is roughly how self-formation ‘‘works’’ for Levinas: the ‘‘me’’ part of the self
senses the demand of an other, responds despite itself, and thus is pressed by a respon-
sibility it never chose.15 And so it tries to escape. It flees into itself to evade the
demands of responsibility. But when the ‘‘me’’ retreats into the self, it finds the ego
there already having taken up residence. That movement of the ‘‘me’’ into the self
interrupts the sovereignty that the ego formerly thought it possessed. Note that this
self-revelation occurs in interior space but is put in motion by what is not-me—‘‘the
other’’—and thus I am ‘‘ego’’ and ‘‘me’’ and ‘‘other,’’ all at once, deep within myself.
The ego will still insist on its existential solitude and will operate as if it were perfectly
autonomous, owing nothing it didn’t choose to owe. But the ‘‘me’’ will continuously
interrupt the ego’s assertion of independence, because it will keep trying to flee the
demands placed on it by the presence of others, and all of this transpires fairly
constantly in waves of affectivity wrought by human sense.
What does this description of the human self get for us? If the self is defined as
exposed, vulnerable, and formed in part in relation to others, then it makes more
sense that others would have the power to harm the self in deep and lasting ways. It
also does justice to the depth of the attachments we form, since vulnerability is not
only a negative asset: it may open us to abuse, oppression, and death, but it also makes
possible friendship, solidarity, and love. Autonomy has that vulnerability as its back-
drop.
The self given to us by liberalism would define its relation to others in terms of its
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autonomy: others are out there, and I choose to interact with them from within the
protected site of my self. Levinas describes the encounter otherwise, arguing that the
presence of others
signifies not the disclosure of a given and its reception, but the exposure of me to
the other, prior to every decision. There is a claim laid on the same by the other
in the core of myself, the extreme tension of the command exercised by the other
in me over me, a traumatic hold of the other on the same, which does not give
the same the time to await the other.16
It isn’t that I find myself at the start fully self-sufficient and capable of deciding for or
against solidarity with others. Rather, others have already laid claim on me, called me
to respond to them before I had time to choose to be affected. Self-formation is like
a trauma striking against a self that would be autonomous. That may give us a richer
sense of what it means to be a human being in general, but it also speaks directly to
the sense of self inhabited by survivors of violence, who may find it more difficult to
give themselves the useful fiction of autonomy. As Judith Herman puts it, ‘‘Traumatic
events destroy the victim’s fundamental assumptions about the safety of the world,
the positive value of the self, and the meaningful order of creation.’’17 A trauma
survivor’s sense of the self ’s independence has been interrupted by violence. That
sense is part of what should be restored by transitional justice or practices of reconcili-
ation. But just as law cannot tell us whether or not we should obey law, autonomy
cannot instruct us in how to restore it wherever it has been lost or never gained in the
first place. Because of the way trauma affects us as embodied creatures, the body and
mind may hold on to loss, sometimes despite the will of the individual, and thus
traumatic memories may recur even in times free from violence. That will matter
when political reconciliation proceeds against the backdrop of a widely traumatized
population.
That I am exposed to others, vulnerable to violence and to love, means that I
cannot so easily ‘‘move on’’ from past loss. My losses haunt me, and they may
resurface despite myself even when I have willed to reconcile with those who have
harmed me. Trauma haunts reconciliation. But that does not render this a hopeless
story. This exposedness also means that time and other human beings might make it
easier or more difficult for the past to be past. Here the passivity of the subject, rather
than resonating only as a loss of autonomy, opens up a future, because of how relation-
ships between human beings transpire. I may be able to find myself sovereign and
unchanged in relation to objects in the world (there’s a chair: I encounter it and
nothing about me changes). But the encounter with other human beings is different.
My relations with others do change me, for better and for worse, and I can’t say that
the movement of that change necessarily accords with my desires or the reasoned
choices I make.
I can’t say that in part because of how time works. Time passes. A chair is a chair
over time, and so with chairs, A!A. But I cannot be certain that A!A with regard
to my self and others in time. Imagine that across a span of moments I encounter
another human being, and she affects me—maybe with kindness, maybe with cruelty.
We could call the moments before and after this event Jill! and Jill". In the interval
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of time between Jill! and Jill", I have been affected by something other than me, and
it has made an impact on what I am. Perhaps something has changed, such that I am
not certain that I am precisely the same Jill who would have allowed me to say A!A
or Jill!Jill. Maybe I thought I embraced a restorative ethic of forgiveness. But when
I faced your lack of remorse, something changed. Or maybe I once thought I could
never live in peace alongside you. But then I came to understand something of your
own loss. Or I saw that you genuinely wished you had never harmed me. Or maybe
a set of government policies lifted me out of a life of daily deprivation. Perhaps now
I have begun to think I can live alongside you, whether or not I can forgive. The other
opens up a dimension of the future that I would not achieve on my own. My point:
this reading of the subject gives us a sense of why revision is possible for a human
being and also why it is difficult. The narrative of the autonomous liberal subject, on
its own, does not.
Hearing
For Levinas, communication proceeds not only by language but in bodily signs. We
give off meanings and receive them from others all the time, whether we will it or
not. A significant amount of meaning is carried and transferred in this way. Commu-
nication may and often does contain a specific content, which the speaker intends the
audience to receive and understand. But communication has a prior phenomenology.
Just as a sensation of heat, flavor, or odor is not primarily cognition of those things
but an undergoing of a sensation, communication is, prior to its instrumental use for
sending a message, a form of responsiveness to other human beings.18 It exists because
there are others, to whom we respond. Some of our responses are reasoned and willed;
others—many of the primary ones—are not. That will matter in a scene of reconcili-
ation when wounds, difference, and history complicate what is said with the
impossibility of overcoming what is still feared, felt, and mourned.
An example. Mrs. Kondile had the opportunity to testify at the amnesty hearing
for Dirk Coetzee, the man who headed the ‘‘task force’’ that tortured and killed her
son. She refused to do so, sending a representative to make this statement in her stead:
You have said that you would like to meet Mrs. Kondile and look her in the eye.
It is an honor she feels you do not deserve. And that if you were really remorseful,
you wouldn’t apply for amnesty, but in fact stand trial for what you did.19
We can’t know why Mrs. Kondile made this choice, but we can guess that she saw no
profit in facing a man who tortured and mutilated her son. By refusing to face him
she also decreased the risk that her presence at the hearing would be understood,
against her will, as embodying a willingness to participate in a ritual of forgiveness. In
an interview Mrs. Kondile gave later, she made clear what she wished to communicate:
‘‘It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to forgive . . . they lead vindicated lives. In my life,
nothing, not a single thing, has changed since my son was burnt by barbarians . . .
nothing. Therefore I cannot forgive.’’20 We might say that Mrs. Kondile communi-
cated more by not speaking to Coetzee than she would have if she had faced him. She
also made clear that current political and institutional conditions did not make recon-
ciliation possible for her.
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Human beings do not possess equal power to ignore or suppress attempts at
communication. Some truths get heard more loudly than others, due to power, insti-
tutional procedures, receptiveness of audience, and widely varying factors beyond the
control of any one speaker. But there is something other than power at stake in what
is risky in the attempt. Levinas reminds us that ‘‘to require that a communication be
sure of being heard is to confuse communication and knowledge, to efface the
difference, to fail to recognize the signifyingness of the-one-for-the-other in me.’’21
He means that communication is not a simple transfer of meaning from point A in
me to point B in another person or a larger audience. It is part of the work of subject
formation, in which I am me but am also other than me, creating meanings, receiving
messages from others, and always at risk of misunderstanding or being misunderstood.
Part of what it means to be formed by others is to be subjected to regimes of meaning
that are at times beyond our power to choose or control. It’s not that autonomy is
meaningless here, but that it misses the point.
Consider the example of Yazir Henry, who also testified before South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). He had been tortured and forced to
admit the location of where a comrade was hiding. That friend was then killed. Henry
lived for years in a prison of his own guilt, too ashamed to speak of what had happened
to him and unable to resume living a normal life. He wanted the TRC to give him a
space where he could testify not only to the truth of his betrayal but to his own
victimization: that at the age of seventeen he was put in the impossible position of
choosing between the life of his mother and family and that of his friend. Instead his
testimony took on a life of its own: Antjie Krog told an edited version in her book
Country of My Skull; various newspapers took up the story and molded it to the
narrative form of crime and political forgiveness; and his name appeared in the TRC
Final Report in conjunction with the case of his dead friend, making his guilt official
rather than helping to lift its weight.22 As a result, his testimony put him in more
danger: ‘‘In the two and a half years since occupying that space, I have survived one
attempt on my life and I have been accosted and humiliated several times in public
for reasons relating to my entering the space provided by the TRC.’’23 Henry experi-
enced in a deadly way the risks of communication. His experience also offers us
another view into the layers of betrayal operating in any scene of reconciliation. He
had approached the TRC with the hope that the burden of his personal devastation
would be lifted, and that the TRC would do justice to the impossible position he was
put in by his role in a political struggle, only to discover that ‘‘the TRC had neither
the time nor the logistical capacity to honour or protect the space it gave me in which
to bare my soul and tell my story.’’24
Some testimony is heard, understood, or misunderstood, and then it enters a
public realm, where it will have multiple meanings, many of them beyond the control
of their author. But there are also forms of testimony about violence that struggle with
the boundaries of what can be spoken. They are closer to the meanings we give off
without speech:
This inside me . . . fights my tongue. It is . . . unshareable. It destroys . . . words.
Before he was blown up, they cut off his hands so he could not be fingerprinted
. . . So how do I say this?—this terrible . . . I want his hands back.25
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How can a grieving person explain in official testimony, in everyday language, that
she or he wants the hands back of someone cherished, because these hands are all that
is left of the embodied presence of this cherished person? This is not declarative speech
in any ordinary sense. But it is testimony. Both Yazir Henry and the person who
requests a return of the only physical trace of her loved one, mangled as it is, are
persons who will feel included or excluded, will accept or refuse to honor a transitional
institution. Their lives have been cut open by loss such that they might not easily
inhabit the sense the autonomous subject has, that others are out there and ‘‘I’’ choose
to interact with them from within the protected site of my self. Transitional justice
and political reconciliation both must reckon with what is at the same time combus-
tible and inescapable about survivors of violence: they may dwell in their harms far
past what reason or autonomy can rescue on its own, not because they ‘‘can’t get over
it,’’ but because of what violence and injustice can do to human beings. That point
has ethical import both for those who have been harmed and for those who have not
but who wish to encourage reconciliation or a smooth transition to democracy.
Changing how we think about self-formation as it bears on recovery or reconciliation
will help here.
Responsibility
If we change how we think about how we come to be selves, we might also change
how we think about what we owe to others, even others who are our enemies. Krog
writes, ‘‘Is truth that closely related to identity? It must be. What you believe to be
true depends on who you believe yourself to be.’’26 I have argued elsewhere that the
first response put forth by the autonomous subject described by liberal political theory,
when faced with a responsibility beyond conditions to which she would consent,
would likely be: ‘‘How did I ever come to owe this?’’27 She’ll want to know what
makes this responsibility legitimate, how it came to fall on her, and by what right she
has been asked to take it up. In other words, all of her questions will be animated by
legal reasoning, because the subject of liberal political theory is only responsible for
what she has done or intended. Of course those questions are important—and some
of them can be easily answered in a scene of reconciliation, by recourse to histories of
blame. But not every scene of reconciliation is peopled by actors who fall easily into
clearly distinguishable categories of victim and persecutor. There will be bystanders
and beneficiaries, those who benefited from injustice without taking active part in it.
Histories are complex and intertwined, full of attack and counterattack, intermediary
positions, wins, losses, and draws. But even if we know who is victim and who is
perpetrator, can we capture all of what needs to be conveyed in the reasoning
prescribed by legal proceedings? The very existence of truth commissions and other
alternatives to legal responses to violence suggests that we cannot. And so it might
matter (as I have argued elsewhere) that if a similar question of responsibility is posed
to a Levinasian subject, still free but aware of the vulnerability of herself and others in
a world we have to share, her response might be (instead of: ‘‘How did I ever come
to owe this?’’) something more like: ‘‘What does justice—or mere peaceful cohabi-
tation—require?’’ or even: ‘‘What does it require of me?’’28 The difference
matters—and it is a difference we should not consign too readily to the realm of
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idealism in a world where the most entrenched injustices cannot be answered solely
by recourse to reliance on legitimately owed legalized duties. No one will be reconciled
in a world where every legal duty is dispatched, and nothing more.
We do not often find Levinasian strands in the theories of liberal political subjec-
tivity from which we inherit our ideas about rights, justice, and the rule of law, and
which for the most part, in turn, inspire the hopes and procedures of transitional
justice and post-conflict reconciliation. It is of course dangerous, if not utterly objec-
tionable, to suggest that any person beyond one’s own self ought to forgive or
reconcile, because forgiveness and reconciliation are movements that must be made
freely. Subjection has its limits. And yet the sense that we do respond to the needs of
others prior to any capacity for self-affirmation of the ego may be precisely what needs
to be recovered or uncovered in the wake of political violence and estrangement if
there is to be hope of something we might call reconciliation. Absent such a renewed
idea of the subject, all we have are the truths of capitalism and/or democracy: human
relationships based on commerce, with or without open hostility, a chest of drawers
lined with assumptions about reciprocity and consent to any conditions in which
responsibility might be born(e), and filled with autonomous sovereign subjects who
share space with others because all agree (or would have agreed, had they been given
a chance) that such an arrangement is preferable to the insecurity resulting from a lack
of agreement.29
Such a narrative grants to us community based in personal security and measured
reciprocity. That is not nothing, especially to those who have lived without it. But it
does not reckon with the uncertainty recommenced in every scene of communication,
nor with the ways in which old traumas may resurface regardless of what is willed in
the freedom of reasoned volition, and how those resurfacings will be communicated
to others in ways intended and unintended, causing ripples and informing relation-
ships.
Two moments with a newspaper may illustrate this point: (!) Mrs. Kondile,
waking up one day to a story about an investigation and discovering graphic details
about the torture and murder of her son ten years earlier; and (") Jean Améry, twenty
years after he was released from Bergen-Belsen, reading a letter to the editor from a
young German who writes that his generation is ‘‘sick and tired of hearing again and
again that our fathers killed six million Jews.’’30
Two Truths
Transitional justice aims to create a certain kind of present moment, one that does
justice to a past that requires redress while opening up a future that isn’t fully deter-
mined by past harms. Accordingly, among its many duties, a prominent one is coming
up with a good accounting of the truth. But what is ‘‘the truth’’ in a scene of reconcili-
ation?
Truth emerges at multiple sites, simultaneously. Sometimes A and not-A are true
at the same time. The ‘‘truth’’ of this often surfaces obliquely in scholarly writing
about reconciliation and truth-seeking mechanisms. I’ll offer some examples. Donna
Pankhurst writes, ‘‘Contrasting, if not actually contradictory understandings of justice
and reconciliation, and their relationship to each other and to peace currently operate,
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even in the same settings.’’31 Rustom Bharucha adds, ‘‘While the history that replaces
‘historical truth’ for ‘subjectivity’ is flawed, the omniscient, objective, fact-bound
history that seems to ‘write itself ’ in Roland Barthes’s words, is also flawed in its own
right.’’32 Martha Minow notes the disjunction as well: ‘‘Justice may call for truth but
also demands accountability. And the institutions for securing accountability—
notably, trial courts—may impede or ignore truth.’’33 Pankhurst adds, ‘‘The ambition
to create a single, complete, common truth from all possible accounts is rarely hoped
for, let alone achieved.’’34 And Robert Meister points out, ‘‘The Lincolnian ‘survivor
story’ is inherently a better way of coping with the guilt of perpetrators than of doing
justice to the victims, and . . . justice to victims may be more effectively achieved in
other ways.’’35 Citations such as these proliferate. In scenes of longstanding injustice,
truth is a fluid thing. However, these notions of truth are also challenged by views of
truth as a form of certainty. For instance, Michael Ignatieff asserts, ‘‘Either the siege
at Sarajevo was a deliberate attempt to terrorize and subvert the elected government
of an internationally recognized state or it was a legitimate preemptive defense of the
Serbs’ homeland from Muslim attack. It cannot be both.’’36 Surely that statement is
true. Its assertion helps to restrict the number of falsehoods that might be taken for
true in the Balkans. But it also seems somehow too simple if viewed through the lens
of the work required to reconcile post-violence. It is not that we ought to conciliate
genocidal regimes; rather, the simplicity of Ignatieff ’s statement gives us a forensic
truth with no regard for the personal or narrative truths that often underlie mass
violence and which also may play a role in recovery from violence as well as prevention
of further violence.
Factual or forensic truth is ‘‘defined as a form of scientifically ‘corroborated
evidence,’ drawn on ‘accurate information through reliable procedures,’ framed within
a ‘social scientist methodology of research’ ’’ and so on.37 That is legalism’s truth for
good reason: fair proceedings must rely on verifiable evidence gathered using agreed-
upon procedures, or the basis of fairness in a court setting is lost. And yet, in a legal
proceeding, other truths are lost when survivors’ stories, directed by questions posed
by court officials, are limited to the facts of the case. It is widely believed that truth
commissions improve the lot of witnesses by allowing a wider range of stories to be
told, in a setting less constrained by procedures designed to promote a fair trial for
defendants. And yet truth commissions do tend to focus on factual or forensic truth
over personal or narrative truth, even when their professed aims include getting the
truth out by hearing victims’ stories. Thus the South African TRC, in its final report,
hoped that victim testimony offered ‘‘healing potential’’ for the victims but also
worried about the ‘‘veracity’’ of the stories told, since the stories of witnesses and
survivors are not always verifiable: either there is no person or evidence left to corrob-
orate the truth, or the content of the truth is not factual or forensic.38
Levinas points out that philosophers tend to think that truth consists of intelligi-
bility, an ‘‘exhibition of being,’’ the revelation of something that exists and is verifiably
true. But, he adds, when philosophers stop there, they fail to ask what shows itself in
truth and who looks.39 Those questions place truth in its embodied context. Rustom
Bharucha, writing about the relation between truth, reconciliation, and storytelling,
echoes this emplacement of truth in the body, asserting that ‘‘there is no one Truth.
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Rather, there are many possible truths—mutable, fluid, and above all, deviant—that
have to be constantly produced from the guts, the bodies and voices of actors.’’40 The
fluidity of truth is also what is at stake in Antjie Krog’s assessment of what truth could
and could not do for South Africa:
It is asking too much that everyone should believe the Truth Commission’s version
of the truth. Or that people should be set free by this truth, should be healed and
reconciled. But perhaps these narratives alone are enough to justify the existence
of the truth commission. Because of these narratives, people no longer can indulge
in their separate dynasties of denial.41
(This has by now become dogma about what the TRC accomplished: ‘‘narrowing the
range of permissible lies,’’ as IDEA’s Reconciliation after Violent Conflict puts it.42)
Establishing truth after atrocity is important. The telling of stories in the TRC
proceedings did open up a history of violence that had been silenced by official forms
of truth backed by racist power. And yet there are other tasks at hand in the work of
reconciliation. There is only so much that the revelation of a truth can do, especially
when its being heard does not necessarily render it universally persuasive; when
revealing it does not automatically heal the victim or reconcile her with her persecutor;
when the persecutor may not apologize or may be officially pardoned for acting on
‘‘political motives’’ (for instance, Dirk Coetzee was granted amnesty by the TRC on
August !, "##$);43 when some truths are privileged in a climate where reconciliation
is sought over continuing resistance and anger (as when commissioners of the TRC
encouraged forgiveness and discouraged even justified resentment, prompting one
woman to say, ‘‘The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, what makes me
even angrier is that they are trying to dictate my forgiveness’’);44 and when factors
other than truth may be more effective at encouraging reconciliation in a particular
setting—for instance, an end to threats of violence, reparation programs, attention to
structural inequalities and basic material needs, or even the passage of time.45
Forensic truth cannot, on its own, deliver to us the full story of Mrs. Kondile’s
loss; it is the kind of truth for which who looks and what shows itself in truth does not
matter. Intelligibility is the subject of philosophy, as it is of social science and politics.
But none of these is made only of factual or forensic truth.
Conclusion: Permanent Reconciliation
South Africa, for various context-specific reasons, after decades of violently oppressive
and racist law and policy, chose the route of a truth commission rather than criminal
trials. Most parties agreed that it was the only way to move forward without a lot of
bloodshed and an extended civil war between a black majority and a white minority
that still possessed considerable political, economic, and military power. Nelson
Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu were able to call on existing values within
Christianity and the African tradition of ubuntu to support a policy of forgiveness in
order to rebuild community—or to build it anew where it never before existed. But
the hope of the long-term success of the TRC was premised on its promise not only
to bring out the truth of what happened but to offer meaningful social change for all
and specific reparations for those most egregiously affected by past abuses. The failure
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of the post-Apartheid government—due to decisions taken under the weight of
combined economic and political constraints—to offer meaningful change or repara-
tions has left South Africa in a tenuous position. As Yazir Henry describes it,
Legal and political apartheid has gone but social, economic and psychological
apartheid remains and will for a long time to come . . . Not only do we live with
serious post-war trauma, we carry this condition in a context of continued social
and economic oppression.46
What if a self, trying earnestly to recover from a trauma, still faces a life that, every
day, is full of a form of neglect that mimics the oppression supposedly left behind?
How does that self trust in a better future promised by the rule of law? What would
make such trust possible?
In Argentina, the military granted itself amnesty before handing over power to
Raul Alfonsı́n. Alfonsı́n overturned the self-amnesty law, trials were held, and nine
heads of the military junta were convicted in !"#$. The military rebelled, so in !"#%
and !"#& Alfonsı́n passed laws restricting further prosecutions. In !"#"–"', Alfonsı́n’s
successor Carlos Menem pardoned those who had been convicted but also passed laws
authorizing reparations for those who had been detained by the military. In June (''$,
under pressure from an organized public campaign, Argentina’s congress overturned
the law that had restricted the prosecutions of the military. Reconciliation of past with
present has never been a settled matter in Argentina.47 Transitional justice has taken
many turns. Interaction between time, harm, and recovery such as this leads David
Backer, who has studied attitudes toward the TRC in South Africa over time, to
conclude that ‘‘transitional justice issues in postconflict settings often entail processes
that will and should unfold over an extended period of time—a decade, if not consid-
erably longer.’’48
The self, in Levinas’s description, recurs. It reaches out toward the other but is
not capable of escaping its embodied site. Nonetheless, when self returns to self,
having encountered the other, the scene looks different. The other human being has
placed the self in question, and the self is no longer able to remain at home alone with
its imperialism. This is not a story of something that once happened but a figure for
what happens every moment.
It happens at every moment, but it happens below the level of consciousness.
Anyone can refuse to acknowledge the other, can dehumanize, oppress, persecute, or
murder the other. But no one inhabits a world such that she escapes her bodily site
and evades being affected by others. This is why violence has such a hold on us. We
are vulnerable by definition. There are countless ways—just and unjust—of not taking
responsibility for all others or some others: desensitization to others and to violence,
racism and bigotry, reasoned limitation on responsibility, contracts and rules of
behavior. But the self is not a monad. It is changed by circumstances, and circum-
stances are peopled by others. That is why ‘‘most reconciliations are fragile, partial,
and in constant need of renewal.’’49 Human beings live each new moment, traversing
time, facing other human beings—and time and other human beings change things.
But it is this very feature of human beings, that they traverse time and are vulnerable
to others, each of us a self changed by circumstances and not precisely identical to
PAGE 41
Stauffer: Speaking Truth to Reconciliation 41
................. 18362$ $CH5 01-17-13 16:00:30 PS
PAGE 42
42 Humanity Spring 2013
itself over time, that makes reconciliation possible, because subject formation is recon-
ciliation of self with self and other. What is needed is permanent reconciliation.
We could start with the simple idea that compromises made for the sake of
political transition will at some point become compromises built into a system of
justice. And then what? Change will be desired. That change might awaken old or
introduce new divisions, but not changing might do so as well. Donna Pankhurst
describes how a population that has lived without meaningful rights for a long time
may react positively to ‘‘rather limited improvements,’’ but over time this will surely
change because of new relationships and expectations formed in the somewhat
improved situation of justice. She adds that accepting a minimalist conception of the
rule of law in the short term likely means desiring a maximalist conception in the
longer term, which will require change, which may upset order, and so on.50 And she
concludes,
In the longer term, competing conceptions of justice re-emerge. For protagonists
the need for social justice and/or historic redress becomes a greater priority. For
the international donor community conceptions of justice come to include
political freedoms (particularly as expressed through structures of multiparty
democracy); an effective and independent judiciary; and respect by the
government for human rights.51
And surely the people subject to governance will also have competing ideas about the
hierarchy of values expressed by democratic institutions. Those ideas will come to
them in communication with others, whether by rational discourse or the way human
beings give off meanings prior to speech. There can be no one-time settlement of
claims such that the future is set free from the past.
Contemporary South Africa is a case in point. It is still largely a divided society:
one part success story consisting of a stable political system, honest courts, and a
growing economy; and the flipside of that success, plagued by impoverishment of !"
percent of the country, a !# percent unemployment rate, and a Gini coefficient (a
statistical measure of inequality) of #.$ that marks it, alongside Brazil, as ‘‘the most
unequal society in the world.’’52 Continuing inequality, along with a failure of the
government to live up to promises attached to the compromise measure that offered
amnesty in exchange for truth at the initial moment of transition, has led to a sharp
decline in approval of amnesty, decreased acceptance of its necessity, and more
demands for accountability.
In studies conducted by Backer, %& percent of respondents in '##'–( accepted
amnesty as a necessary compromise. By '##) approval numbers had dropped to '#.!
percent.53 Backer argues that this change in attitude shows us at least two things: (&) a
high rate of acceptance does not necessarily mean a high rate of satisfaction—especially
when it involves enormous compromise—and so we should be mindful of what is
promised and what is delivered; and (') what a government does in the wake of an
initial compromise, and how its decisions affect the lives of people over time, will
determine how stable the settlement is. The original high rate of approval was, Backer
suggests, attached to reluctant acceptance of political realities paired with expectations
that the government would live up to its promises to prosecute those who did not
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receive amnesty, make meaningful economic changes, and compensate victims with
reparations.
In the period of time between surveys, reparations were made only grudgingly
(with South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki arguing that the liberation struggle was
not fought for money) and at lower levels than promised.54 Also during that time, the
National Prosecuting Authority policies around prosecution were modified, allowing
enough discretion in prosecuting cases that many thought it amounted to a second
amnesty, this time without hearings. All of that may have led to widespread perception
that promises were not being kept. That is why Backer concludes about transitional
justice in general that
the immediate consequences of any measure do not necessarily represent a durable
status quo. Instead, these outcomes are contingent, subject to ongoing scrutiny
and reassessment by interested stakeholders and therefore vulnerable in the event
of altered conditions, including the introduction of new policies and the lack of
follow-through on existing policies.55
Backer reaches a conclusion similar to my philosophical one by relying on empirical
data gathered over time. South Africa’s TRC may be the most celebrated instance of
a truth commission, one that revolutionized the form, changing its mission from one
of truth-seeking or investigation to one of truth-telling or performance. But we are
still in the midst of a historical arc in which the success of the TRC is undecidable.
Current attitudes may ‘‘lead to a revisiting of the amnesty and become an impetus for
criminal prosecutions.’’56 This point fits well with Pankhurst’s reminder that, even
though in the wake of violence many people will in the short term accept a minimalist
version of justice, ‘‘in the longer term, competing conceptions of justice re-emerge.’’
Robert Meister puts it clearly in the context of his analysis of the Warren-era
Supreme Court’s attention to racism in the United States: ‘‘They seemed to be saying
that we can never recover from our past unless we believe ourselves to be in permanent
recovery—that we are never in greater danger of reviving racism than when we believe
ourselves to have overcome it.’’57 And so he calls for something like a ‘‘permanent
reconstruction . . . to shed light on the logic of post-traumatic justice, as something
distinct from both revolutionary justice or ahistorical liberalism.’’58 Ahistorical liber-
alism might think setting up equal justice governed by fair institutions and the rule of
law is enough. Revolutionary justice might use violence to secure peace. But post-
traumatic justice must constantly mark the continuing presence of the past, to guard
against the resurgence of violence where there could be peaceful cohabitation. Just as
the past history of slavery in the United States might augment the harm of racial
discrimination in the present (Meister’s point), asking a group of persons who think
themselves beyond caste to play out caste roles in a theater workshop in India might
reveal caste differentiations—and harms—lurking beneath professions of secularism;59
in turn, the failure of a government to live up to promises may make approval for a
compromise drop from !" percent to #$.% percent in a matter of years, as it did in
Cape Town, South Africa; and accusing Serbs of unjustly invading Kosovo will awaken
centuries-old but sometimes still vibrant anger over a piece of land lost in "&'! (even
when the accusation is just). Any of these things might happen between persons trying
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to live alongside one another. The point of the analogy is not to draw an equivalence
between them or judge whether each possibility should or should not come to pass,
but to mark how the past is alive in different ways and to varying degrees for different
groups and individuals. Such a relation to the past is a deeply felt, embodied expe-
rience, ‘‘where remembering and reliving are indistinguishable,’’ at times even for
those who never lived that past.60 We can make no meaningful pronouncements about
what it means to reconcile or tell the truth if we do not take note of this.
It is important that timely trials be held and that truth commissions project time-
lines for collecting testimony, publish results, and offer recommendations, so that
something may be seen to be happening. After all, justice is not done until it is seen
to be done. But if memories of violence return—as they likely will—then one can
never finally project a timeline for the achievement of reconciliation. As the South
African satirist Pieter-Dirk Uys remarks, ‘‘Remember, the future is certain. It is the
past that’s unpredictable.’’61 Reconciliation can never be finished, and as it continues
it will likely be punctuated by disturbing ruptures, unexpected truths, and new
problems necessitating new attention to the work of reconciling. Minimal solidarity,
sometimes more than that, may be achieved after violence, not because a fair and
impartial institution assumes the equality of autonomous monads but because human
beings are vulnerable to and formed by others. Institutions may help or hinder in that
solidarity’s formation—and the rule of law can be a big help here—but solidarity is
also anarchic: it may come from elsewhere. It may even refuse to honor the work done
by a transitional institution.
So what makes a revisionary practice work? How can survivors of violence and
unjust treatment rediscover (or exercise for the first time) the capacity to take on the
present moment freely? I am currently writing a book about that, but here is the short
answer: survivors want the harms they have undergone to be heard, and the wrongness
of them affirmed in a lasting way not only by the perpetrators but by the surrounding
society. They seek the help of others to reassure themselves that they are living in a
world with others, one in which they will be protected when they are under threat.
They seek meaningful human rights. I’m not sure that any human institution has yet
figured out how to deliver that. It seems to me that a Levinasian understanding of the
kind of being a human being is will sooner get us meaningful human rights than will
the liberal subject’s insulated autonomy. The Levinasian understanding will get us
those meaningful human rights in two ways: (!) by helping us develop more robust
understandings of what is lost by human beings who have been violently abused; and
(") by making clear to us—in a way liberalism cannot—that if we are content to
derive our duties only from conditions to which we would consent, we may as well
give up on human rights as an aspiration. No one will be reconciled, and many will
be left unprotected, in a world where everyone dispatches every legitimate legal duty
and nothing more.
Liberalism’s ‘‘happy ending’’ hinges on formal equality and finds us consenting to
conditions everyone would wish to bear. But transitional justice and political reconcili-
ation seriously hinder the will to believe that those conditions are forthcoming. And
so it may be time to view the path to happy endings differently. Perhaps we get there
not by accepting duty only for what we did and intended but by taking up a form of
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responsibility that transcends legality’s concern with blame and acknowledges the wide
array of harms and relationships in which we are implicated as responsive creatures
trying to share a world. Such a statement resonates as idealism, but it is actually
relentlessly practical. The liberal rule-of-law story about consent and formal equality
is not, on its own, going to get us meaningful human rights. It is time to start working
with what may do better.
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